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THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE OF EQUITABLY
DISTRIBUTING THE PROCEEDS OF MINERAL RESOURCE
EXTRACTION FROM CHINA'S ETHNIC MINORITY
AUTONOMOUS AREAS
LIN FENG* AND JASON BUHI
I. INTRODUCTION
The natural resources that humans extract from the environment are
the fountainhead of development and prosperity. Their depletion, especially
the inequitable consumption of local, non-renewable natural resources by
foreign consumers, is a primary cause of unrest and conflict around the
world, most poignantly for developing nations. While the social injustices
associated with resource exploitation across international boundaries are
often scrutinized, the transfer of resource wealth within the boundaries of a
nation can be equally controversial and problematic, especially between
ethnic groups. China experiences this reality and deploys a unique legal
matrix designed to address this issue.
Among Beijing's key priorities are developing its inland western
territories, alleviating the systemic inequities of China's meteoric economic
development, and fostering harmonious relations between the majority Han
and fifty-five ethnic minorities. Economic development has been more
rapid in the coastal provinces than in the interior, but that gap is beginning
to close. Technological advances and infrastructure improvements are now
allowing Chinese engineers to access the vast natural riches of China's
western interior, and, with proper governance, the subject regions should
prosper.
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However, China's geopolitical evolution has created an important
policy consideration: its fifty-five recognized ethnic minorities largely
inhabit the vast majority of territory where the abundant natural resources
remain. In many cases, the ethnic minorities inhabit so-called Ethnic
Minority Autonomous Regions (EMARs) wherein they nominally enjoy
expanded rights to govern their own affairs. In the interests of social
harmony and fundamental fairness, the extraction and exploitation of
resources from these areas must be conducted with sensitivity to local
conditions.
Indeed, while the central authorities claim exclusive sovereignty
over China's natural wealth, the actual pattern of resource distribution
between the central and local governments reflects a more nuanced
balancing of interests. Examining this relationship exposes the extent of
practical autonomy and political dignity enjoyed at each level, and yields
the conclusion that the central authorities should continue to seek to provide
fair and direct compensation for non-renewable resources extracted from all
of the EMARs. Indeed, further compensation reform is imperative under
existing Chinese law. Article 122 of the Chinese Constitution, several
articles of the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy (LREA), the political
commitment to socialism, and the Western Development Strategy all
provide a strong theoretical foundation for a more equitable distribution
pattern. The 2010 resource tax reform promulgated for the benefit of the
Xinjiang EMAR provides a promising prototype for tangible policies that
should be implemented nationwide.
This article specifically focuses upon the legal regime governing
resource extraction from China's EMARs. Section II will provide a brief
introduction of the basic geographical overlap between China's valuable,
non-renewable natural resources and its ethnic minority population
concentrations. This section will also introduce the legal framework for the
EMARs. Next, Section III will explore the current legal regime governing
mineral rights, beginning with the national Constitution and then tracing the
highest laws promulgated by the National People's Congress and State
Council. Section III also will discuss the current distribution of proceeds
from resource taxes and mineral compensation fees between the central and
local governments, and introduce the new Xinjiang resource tax reform.
Section IV will assess the status quo vis-a-vis the mandates of the Chinese
Constitution, the political commitment to socialism, the LREA, and the
decade-old Western Development Strategy (WDS) initiative. As espoused
in Section V, this exercise reveals that Beijing has a rare opportunity that
any government should welcome-the opportunity to weave together a
comprehensive set of policies that can, in concert, achieve many of its
developmental priorities.
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II. OVERVIEW OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN AND THE FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA: THE OVERLAP OF MINERALS AND
MINORITIES
A. East v. West: Haves and Have-nots
China is often divided into eastern and western halves to
demonstrate its unbalanced endowments and uneven march toward
modernization. In 1933, geographer Hu Huanyong drew a line from Heihe,
Heilongjiang, in the northeast, to Tengchong, Yunnan, in the southwest,
splitting China into halves-the haves and have-nots.' According to
contemporary statistics, the region west of the line comprised 57% of
China's total land area but was inhabited by only 4% of its total population.
Demographic change was marginal over the subsequent seventy-five years
despite the great socio-political turbulence. A 2002 update reported that the
area west of the Heihe-Tengchong line then contained only 6% of China's
total populace.2
While the Heihe-Tengchong line remains convenient for simple
introductory and visualization purposes, China's modern administrators
divide the country into three more nuanced regions-eastern, central,4 and
western.' First introduced in the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990), this
delineation classifies Chinese provinces based on their distance from the
eastern seaboard and comparative level of development. The western
region originally comprised the administrative units of Gansu, Guizhou,
Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, Xizang (Tibet) and Yunnan.
However, the west was expanded to twelve administrative units in 1999
with the announcement of the WDS.8 Chongqing became China's fourth
provincial-level municipality in 1997, and the Inner Mongolian and
Guangxi autonomous regions were transferred to benefit from special
' DEVELOPING CHINA'S WEST: A CRITICAL PATH TO BALANCED NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
4-7 (Y.M. Yeung & Shen Jianfa eds., 2004). That line has become known variably as the Hu Huanyong
line or the Heihe-Tengchong Line ( -R 1, Hihd-Tdngchang xidn).
2 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions And Growth 18-19 (2007).
YEUNG & JIANFA, supra note 1, at 3-4. ("The eastern region consists of [twelve] provincial
units along China's eastern shore, namely, Liaoning, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu,
Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi[,] and Hainan.").
4 Id. at 4. ("The central region [originally] consist[ed] of the [nine] provincial units of
Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan[,] and Jiangxi.").
s Id. ("The western region consists of the [nine] provincial units of Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia,
Quinhai, Xinjiang, Sichuan (including Chongqing), Yunnan, Guizhou[,] and Tibet.").
6 See id. , at 3.
7 Id. at 4.
8 YEUNG & JIANFA, supra note 1, at 4.
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developmental privileges. 9 As such, all five of China's EMARs - Guangxi,
Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang - are now classified as part
of China's western frontier.10
B. The Distribution ofResources
Under that soil (and those people) lays the vast majority of China's
remaining mineral resources, including its metallic, coal, petroleum, and
natural gas reserves." That concentration is undoubtedly a strong
comparative advantage for the west in general, and the large EMARs
therein specifically. 12 A 2006 report on China's natural resource
distribution notes:
Among the total 1.59 mineral resources with proven
reserves throughout the country, 138 can be found in the
western region of China. Among them, over [thirty]
mineral resources such as coal, petroleum [,] . . . natural
gas, leopoldite, chromite, rare earth minerals, phosphorus,
nickel, vanadium, manganese, copper, zinc [,] and so forth
are plentiful relative to other regions. Xinjiang's
prospective reserves of coal rank first in China. The
prospecting potential of petroleum and natural gas
resources in the Ordos Basin (Inner Mongolia, Ningxia,
Shaanxi, [and] Gansu), Talimu Basin (Xinjiang),
Zhunge'er Basin (Xinjiang), Tulufan and Hami Basin
(Xinjiang), Chaidamu Basin (Qinghai)[,] and Sichuan
Basin are also promising. This region is rich in non-ferrous
metal resources and a major reserve area for non-metallic
mineral resources including mica, asbestos, gypsum, jade[,]
9 Id.
1o See id (noting the western region includes six non-autonomous provinces (Gansu,
Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan), five autonomous regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia,
Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang) and one municipality (Chongqing)).
I See CHINA'S POLICY ON MINERAL RESOURCES (2003), available at
http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/28/content 17963.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) ("Mineral
resources exploration and exploitation are imbalanced between regions. The western regions and the
outlying parts of the central regions abound in resources . . . The comparative advantages of the mineral
resources in the western regions are conspicuous, and their distribution is concentrated, thus providing
the resources foundation for the formation of dominant pillar industries."). Though this paper focuses on
non-renewable oil and mineral resources, it should be noted that China's West also contains the majority
of China's available farmland, forest, and water resources; see YEUNG & JIANFA, supra note 1, at 67-71.
2 Id. ("The degree of difficulty in looking for mineral resources by geological means in the
eastern regions has increased, and the increase range of proved reserves there has slowed down.").
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and magnesite. There are also many kinds of metallic and
nonmetallic ores of high grade found in the region such as
the chromite deposits in Tibet; nickel, copper and zinc
deposits in Gansu; mercury deposits in Guizhou; tin,
phosphorus, copper, lead [,] and zinc deposits in Yunnan;
potassium, aluminum [,] and asbestos deposits in Qinghai,
molybdenum deposits in Shaanxi, and rare earth mineral
deposits in Baiyun Ebo of Inner Mongolia. The region is
also leading in its output of some key mineral products and
non-ferrous metals among its major industrial products.
The region's output of nickel, mercury accounts for 99%,
84%, and 72% respectively, of China's total output, while
that of phosphorus deposits, aluminum [,] and natural gas
accounts for nearly 50% of the country's total output.1
Indeed, the Xinjiang EMAR's coal deposits are estimated to
account for 40% of China's overall reserves, while the oil and gas fields
found in its impressive basins account for 25% and 33% of the national
totals, respectively.14 Xinjiang further contains over 130 kinds of mineral
deposits, the nation's most abundant reserves of beryllium and mica,' 5 and
China's largest copper mine.16 The Tibet EMAR is also believed to contain
extensive reserves of copper, while Inner Mongolia EMAR possesses
abundant veins of rare earth, chromium, aluminum, pyrite and zinc.17 The
Guangxi EMAR is rich in gallium, indium, manganese and tin," and the
Ningxia EMAR - despite its small size - is reported to possess plentiful
coal and natural gas. 19 In addition, "due to the complex geological
conditions and mountainous landforms in the west, the region is fairly rich
in rock ores of important economic value, such as limestone and red earth
for making cement, marble [,] and gypsum for construction [;] and
13 Distribution of China's Mineral Resources (2006), CHINAMINING.ORG,
http://www.chinamining.org/Investment/2007-06-28/1183013840d5869.html (last updated June 6,
2007); see also CHINA'S POLICY ON MINERAL RESOURCES, supra note 11.
14 Profiles of China Provinces, Cities and Industrial Parks: Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region, HONG KONG TRADE DEV. COUNCIL, http://www.hktdc.com/info/mila/mpcn/en/
1X06BVVK/1/Profiles-Of-China-Provinces-Cities-And-Industrial-Parks/XINJIANG-UYGUR-
AUTONOMOUS-REGION.htm (last updated Jan. 31, 2011).
15 d.
1Id.
" Niu Wenyuan & David Y.Q. Chen, Geographical Background and Sustainable
Development, in YEUNG & JIANFA, supra note 1, at 51, 70.
18 Id.
'9 CHINA BRIEFING, BUSINESS GUIDE TO WEST CHINA 51, (Asia Briefing Ltd.
2008)(2008)[hereinafter Bus. Guide].
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mirabilite, barite [,] and optical crystal for other industrial uses." 20 Thus,
China's west generally, and the large EMARs therein specifically, hold the
keys to China's future industrial development.
C. China's Ethnic Minority Nationalities and the Ethnic Minority
Autonomous Regions
According to 2005 statistics, the population of China's fifty-five
ethnic minority nationalities - while accounting for only 9.44% percent of
the total population - numbers 118 million people,2 1 which is a figure
greater than the entire populations of Australia, Canada, and Spain
combined. 22 Approximately eighty percent of that massive ethnic
population lives in China's western region.2 3 This fact has never been lost
on China's leaders. At the creation of the New China, Mao Zedong was
keenly aware that:
The population of the minority nationalities in our country
is small, but the area they inhabit is large. The Han people
comprise [ninety-four] per cent [sic] of the total population,
an overwhelming majority . .. And who has more land?
The minority nationalities, who occupy 50 to 60 [percent]
of the territory. We say China is a country vast in territory,
rich in resources and large in population; as a matter of
fact, it is the Han nationality whose population is large and
the minority nationalities whose territory is vast and whose
resources are rich, or at least in all probability their
resources under the soil are rich.24
20 Wenyuan & Chen, supra note 17, at 51, 70.
21 China Population Association, Important Population Data for 60 Years of New China
(Han and Minority Populations), CHINA POPULATION Ass'N, http://www.cpachn.org.cn/
chinese/Teaching/ShowNews.asp?ID=803 (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).
22 See THE WORLD FACTBOOK, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2119.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011)
(listing, as of July 2011, the populations of Australia, Canada, and Spain as 21,766,711; 34,030,589;
and 6,754,784, respectively).
23 YANG KAIZHONG, ET AL., THE STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPING CHINA'S WEST 4 (2001).
24 Mao Zedong, On the Ten Relationships, Speech at the meeting of the Political Bureau of
the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Apr. 25, 1956) (transcript available at
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_51.htm (last visited
Oct. 1, 2011) (stressing the importance of unity between China's various ethnic groups in order to
construct a strong, socialist nation).
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The peoples inhabiting these lands enjoy identities long coupled
with, yet distinct from the majority Han culture. 25 Their population
concentrations and shared developmental concerns led to official
recognition as minority groups.26 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
began nominally bestowing expanded political rights to its concentrated
minority nationalities through the EMAR system even before the realization
of their state. 27 The Inner Mongolian EMAR was established within
Communist-held territory in 1947, two years before the formal
establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC). 28 Xinjiang was
transformed from a province to an EMAR in 1955, followed
by Guangxi and Ningxia in 1958, and Tibet in 1965.29 Regional autonomy
is recognized in Article 4 of the 1982 PRC Constitution (Constitution): 30
Regional autonomy is practised in areas where people of
minority nationalities live in compact communities; in
these areas organs of self-government are established for
the exercise of the right of autonomy. All the national
autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the [PRC].31
Although this article speaks broadly in terms of the EMARs (i.e.,
the five province-level equivalent administrative divisions), the national
autonomous area system is multi-tiered. Below the EMARs are
administrative subdivisions known as "autonomous prefectures" and
"autonomous counties," respectively, and many of these entities exist
within China's non-autonomous provinces.32 The combined breadth of the
25 See INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF CHINA, REGIONAL AUTONOMY FOR ETHNIC
MINORITIES IN CHINA (2005), available at http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-
07/28/content 18127.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
26 See id.
27 This followed the Soviet practice of recognizing "titular nations" within the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. For information about Soviet Titular Nations, see GRAHAM SMITH ET AL.,
NATION-BUILDING IN THE POST-SOVIET BORDERLANDS 138, 149 (1998).
28 See REGIONAL AUTONOMY FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES IN CHINA (2005), supra note 25.
29 See id.
3 The PRC has had four constitutions, enacted in 1954, 1975, 1978, and 1982 respectively.
The 1954 constitution was based heavily upon the Soviet model and was used to legitimize the
transformation to socialism; the 1975 and 1978 constitutions were promulgated to legitimize the
Cultural Revolution. The fourth and current constitution was adopted in 1982 after the rise of Deng
Xiaoping and adoption of several market-based policies. LIN FENG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CHINA
12-19 (2000).
31 XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 4 (1982) (China), available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
32 See REGIONAL AUTONOMY FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES IN CHINA (2005), supra note 25. By
the end of 2003, China had established 155 ethnic autonomous areas. Of these, five are autonomous
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EMARs is over 6.1 million square kilometres, accounting for 63.72% of
China's total territory. 33 The legal basis for the organization of the
autonomous system is codified in Chapter 3, Section 6, Articles 111 to 122
of the Constitution, and explained in much greater detail under
the LREA."
Each of the fifty-five ethnic minorities, or "minzu," had to satisfy
numerous criteria to achieve official recognition. Population concentration
was a major factor for cultural identification, although absolute majorities
were not required to establish an autonomous area. 3 Indeed, only the
Tibetans are an absolute majority within their EMAR. 38 According to
government statistics, Xinjiang contains a plurality of its designated Uyghur
ethnic minority, while the three other EMARs have absolute majorities of
regions, 30 autonomous prefectures and 120 autonomous counties (sometimes called banners).
According to the fifth national census, conducted in 2000, of the 55 ethnic minorities, 44 have their own
ethnic autonomous areas. The population of ethnic minorities practicing regional autonomy accounts for
71 percent of the total population of ethnic minorities, and the area where such regional autonomy is
practiced accounts for 64 percent of the entire territory of China.
3 Sun Xueguang, Study on Statistics of National Minority Population in China 1, 2,
http://www.statssa.gov.za/isi2009/ScientificProgramme/IPMS/0790.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
34 XIANFA [CONSTITUTION], art. 111-22, §6 (1982) (China) available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
3s See Zh6nghu6 r6nmin g6ngh6gu6 minzi qflyt zizhi f6 (Chinese law name) [Law on
Regional Ethnic Autonomy ] (promulgated by the 2d Session of the 6th Nat'l People's Cong., May 31,
1984, effective Oct. 1, 1984) available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/
index.phpd?showsingle=9507&PHPSESSID=2d0f6ffc081d7f377240da5a284f910c (last visited Oct. 1,
2011) [hereinafter Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy]. The Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy
(LREA)( 0-9ARL14 fiKA kAhMM) is a basic legal document for implementing the system of
regional autonomy for ethnic minorities as provided in the Constitution. It defines the relationship
between the central government and the ethnic autonomous regions, as well as the relationship between
different ethnic groups in ethnic autonomous regions. Its legal effect is not limited to the ethnic
autonomous regions only; every individual in China and all state organs must abide by and implement
this law.
3 6 See REGIONAL AUTONOMY FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES IN CHINA (2005), supra note 25.
3 The 1952 Implementation Outline of REA took population concentration as the key factor,
and sought to fulfill its legal promises of assigning minority ethnic groups appropriate representation in
the people's congresses and the people's governments. Party cadres were sent to identify all of the stable
ethnic communities with distinct characteristics regarding language, culture, economy and ethnic
consciousness. These were entitled to recognition as "shaoshu minzu" regardless of population size, land
claims, or cultural development. See The Implementation Outline of REA in the PRC (1952),
(Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Minzu Zizhi Shishi Gangyao), art. 4, 5, available at
http://www.wenbao.net/html/whyichan/Ismc/zhenche/zc001.htm (last visited 12 Dec. 2010); see also
Zhu Guobin et al., Regional Minority Authority in the PRC: A Preliminary Appraisal From a Historical
Perspective, 7 INT'L J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 39 (2000).
3 CHINA INTERNET INFO. CTR., CHINA'S TIBET FACTS & FIGURES 2002,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/tibet-english/rkmz.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) ("By the end of 2001,
the Tibet Autonomous Region had a population of 2.63 million, of which 92.2 percent were Tibetans,
5.9 percent were Han people, while other ethnic peoples accounted for 1.9 percent.").
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Han Chinese. Some of the ethnic minority nationalities have been largely
integrated into mainstream Chinese culture. 40 However, it is well
documented that in the distant EMARs of Xinjiang and Tibet this sense of
separate dignity can underlie separatist violence.4 1 Though the multitude of
grievances causing such dissatisfaction are long and historical, one major
source is the perception that local resources are being exploited for the
benefit of the Han majority largely located in the central and eastern
regions.42 Existing Chinese law addresses this particular grievance, which is
detailed later, but further adjustments are needed.
The EMARs differ from regular provinces in many constitutional
regards. Politically, the minorities therein are guaranteed appropriate
legislative representation in the Regional People's Congress, the National
People's Congress, and the Standing Committee of the National People's
3 Preeti Bhattacharji, Uighurs and China 's Xinjiang Region, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(July 6, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/publication/16870/uighurs and chinas xinjiangregion.html (last
visited Oct.1, 2011). ("The Chinese government says Xinjiang is home to thirteen major ethnic groups.
The largest of these groups is the Uighurs, who comprise 45 percent of Xinjiang's population, according
to a 2003 census.").
40 China's Fastest Growing Provinces: The Demographics, CHINA BREIFING, (Nov. 8,2010),
available at http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2010/11/08/chinas-fastest-growing-provinces-the-
demographics.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) ("Han Chinese compose 80 percent of the population with
around 17 percent being Mongols.") ; China Through a Lens, CHINA.ORG.CN,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49956.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) ("There are 3.68 million
Han people, accounting for 65.47 percent of Ningxia's total population. Ningxia is home to 33 ethnic
minority groups which have a total population of 1.94 million." ); Sun Xueguang, Study on Statistics of
Minority National Population in China, National Bureau of Statistics (China) available at
http://www.statssa.gov.za/isi2009/ScientificProgramme/IPMS/0790.pdf (last visited Nov 2, 2011)
(Guangxi has a minority population of 17.21 million, accounting for 38.3% of the total population.).
41 June Teuful Dreyer, Assimilation and Accommodation in China, in GOVERNMENT
POLICIES & ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 359 (Michael E. Brown et al., eds., 1997)
(referring to several Chinese minorities including the Bai, Koreans and Zhuang as "all but completely
assimilated.").
42 Human Rights in China, China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tensions
23-25 (2007) ,available at http://hrichina.org/sites/default/files/oldsite/PDFs/MRG-
HRIC.China.Report.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) ("[R]esource extraction from the periphery for use in
China's urban, coastal centres ... can be seen in the disproportionate benefit reaped by those outside the
region of resource origin as compared to the minorities living in the areas. For example, lucrative oil and
gas extraction from [Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang], are fed in pipelines to the coast, rather than
being used locally.. .Mongols, Tibetans and Uyghurs perceive that they are being excluded while their
land and resources are exploited to benefit those living in other, more prosperous areas. This
'development' is taking place without an inclusive process of consultation with minorities, due to their
exclusion in the political realm. Therefore they have limited control or input into these development and
economic policies. Consequently, there is unbalanced investment in sectors and areas that do not meet
with local socio-economic conditions, and do not benefit or empower local communities.").
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Congress (NPCSC). 43 As well as an administrative head that is a member of
the dominant minority ethnic nationality" and, the power to enact local
regulations in light of the subject nationality's political, economic, and
cultural characteristics. Nominally expanded social rights include
responsibility for the maintenance of ethnic art, science, and culture;46 the
organization of local police forces; 47 and the use of minority languages.4 8
More importantly, for the purposes of this article, the Constitution promises
the EMAR leadership important fiscal rights including the rights to
administer regional finances in Article 117, 49 and to promote local
economic development in Article 118.0
43 XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 59, 65, 113 (1982) (China) available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) ("Minority
nationalities are entitled to appropriate representation on the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress." . . . "In the people's congress of an autonomous region, prefecture or county, in
addition to the deputies of the nationality or nationalities exercising regional autonomy in the
administrative area, the other nationalities inhabiting the area are also entitled to appropriate
representation .... ).
"Id. at art. 114 ("The administrative head of an autonomous region, prefecture or county
shall be a citizen of the nationality, or of one of the nationalities, exercising regional autonomy in the
area concerned."). Also, the name of an ethnic autonomous area normally consists of the name of the
place, name of the ethnic group and the word indicating the administrative status, in that order. In the
name of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Guangxi is the name of the place, Zhuang is the
name of the ethnic group and Autonomous Region indicates its administrative status.
45 Id. at art. 116 ("People's congresses of national autonomous areas have the power to enact
autonomy regulations and specific regulations in the light of the political, economic and cultural
characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in the areas concerned. The autonomy regulations and
specific regulations of autonomous regions shall be submitted to the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress for approval before they go into effect.").
46 Id. at art. 119 ("The organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas
independently administer educational, scientific, cultural, public health and physical culture affairs in
their respective areas, sort out and protect the cultural legacy of the nationalities and work for the
development and prosperity of their cultures.").
47 Id. at art. 120 ("The organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas may, in
accordance with the military system of the state and concrete local needs and with the approval of the
State Council, organize local public security forces for the maintenance of public order.").
48 Id at art. 121 ("In performing their functions, the organs of self-government of the
national autonomous areas, in accordance with the autonomy regulations of the respective areas, employ
the spoken and written language or languages in common use in the locality.").
49 XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 117 (1982) (China) available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) ("The organs
of self-government of the national autonomous areas have the power of autonomy in administering the
finances of their areas. All revenues accruing to the national autonomous areas under the financial
system of the state shall be managed and used independently by the organs of self- government of those
areas.").
5o Id. at art. 118 ("The organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas
independently arrange for and administer local economic development under the guidance of state plans.
10
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However, the practical authority of ethnic minorities in the
autonomous regions is often systematically questioned because of the
nomenklatura systems' and the constitutional requirement that autonomous
authorities, but not non-autonomous provinces, gain prior approval from the
NPCSC to pass legislation. 2 For these reasons, it has been contended that
the EMARs are in fact "less autonomous." Nonetheless, the EMARs are
entitled to one further outstanding benefit. Under Article 122, "[t]he State
gives financial, material and technical assistance to the minority
nationalities to accelerate their economic and cultural development."54
III. THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME
This section explores the current provisions relating to the
administration of non-renewable natural resources in China, beginning with
the Chinese Constitution and highest national legislation, and culminating
in the exact distribution of mineral resource compensation fees and resource
taxes between the mining enterprises, central government, and EMAR.
A. The Chinese Constitution
Like its Imperial and Republican predecessors, the PRC
government separates ownership of the Earth's surface from sovereignty
In developing natural resources and building enterprises in the national autonomous areas, the state shall
give due consideration to the interests of those areas.").
" See DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA'S COMMUNIST PARTY: ATROPHY AND ADAPTION 141
(2008) (noting that the nomenklatura system was adopted from the Soviet Communist Party and ensures
that all key government positions are occupied by loyal Communist Party cadres, regardless of ethnicity,
thereby potentially undermining autonomy for the local populations).
52 XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 116, (1982) (China) available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) ("The
autonomy regulations and specific regulations of autonomous regions shall be submitted to the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress for approval before they go into effect .....").
53 See Justin J. Stein, Taking the Deliberative Turn in China: International Law, Minority
Rights, and the Case of Xinjiang, 14 J. PUB. & INT'L AFF. 1, 13-14 (2003), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-issues-1/2003/8.pdf; see also LIN FENG, supra note 30, at 115-158.
54 XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 122, (1982) (China), available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
s Despite changes in government, the Chinese central authorities have always
claimed the ownership right to natural resources. A clear expression of this is visible in the 20' century
history of Chinese mineral extraction laws, an idea used by Xia Chunli in her Ph.D. thesis at the
University of Hong Kong. As she noted, the dynastic claim to possess all mineral resources is apparent
in the Great Qing Charter on Mine Affairs (Daqing Kuangwu Zhangcheng, 1907). Its successor, the
early Republican government, the Mining Regulations of the Republic of China (Zhonghua Minguo
Kuangye Tiaoli, 1914), and the Kuomintang Nationalist government reiterated this claim in its Law on
Mining (Kuangye Fa, 1930). The early PRC first codified its own authority in the Interim Regulations
on Mining of the PRC (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Kuangye Zanxing Tiaoli, 1951). See Xia Chunli,
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over its natural resources. China practices socialist public ownership of land,
meaning "ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the
working people." 56 State ownership means that the State Council exercises
control of the lands on behalf of the people.57 However, while both the State
and rural economic collectives may own land under the Constitution,8 the
State enjoys exclusive ownership of urban property and most natural
resources. 59 Article 9 of the Constitution provides:
Mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains, grassland,
unreclaimed land, beaches and other natural resources are
owned by the State, that is, by the whole people, with the
exception of the forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed
land and beaches that are owned by collectives in
accordance with the law. The State ensures the rational use
of natural resources and protects rare animals and plants.60
This provision is ideological in that the abolition of property in land and the
application of all rents in land to public purposes are fundamental tenants of
Communism,61 and practical in that throughout Chinese history most oil
Autonomous Legislatures Under China's Regional Ethnic Autonomy: Law, Reality and Potential (Sep.
2008), available at http://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/51712/1/FullText.pdf.
56 Zhonghu6 r6nmin g6ngh6gu6 tdi gubnlI fa ( ±J P A) [The Land
Administration Law of the People's Republic of China] (Approved at the 16th Session of the Standing
Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress of the PRC on June 25, 1986. Revised in
accordance with the Decision on amending Land Administration Law of the PRC. Revised and adopted
at the 4th Session of the Standing Committee of the 9th National People's Congress of the People's
Republic of China on Aug. 29, 1998, effective January 1, 1999. Revised at the 11th Session of the
Standing Committee of the 10h National People's Congress on 8/28/04.) art. 2, available at
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/200710/t20071011_656321.htm (last visited 12 Dec. 2010)
[hereinafter Land Administration Law].
57 id.
s8 XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 10, (1982) (China), available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) ("Land in the
cities is owned by the state. Land in the rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives except for
those portions which belong to the state in accordance with the law; house sites and private plots of
cropland and hilly land are also owned by collectives. The State may, in the public interest and in
accordance with the provisions of law, expropriate or requisition land for its use and shall make
compensation for the land expropriated or requisitioned. No organization or individual may appropriate,
buy, sell or otherwise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful means. The right to the use of land may
be transferred according to law. All organizations and individuals who use land must make rational use
of the land.").
" Id. at art. 9-10.
60 Id. at art. 9.
61 See KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1848),
available at http://www.marxistsfr.org/archive/marx/works/download/manifest.pdf However, that same
document decries the very existence of bourgeois private property at all.
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and mineral exploitation would have been impossible without massive State
investment.62 Although stated in absolute terms, in reality there is a more
nuanced division of mineral rights between the central government and the
local governments than indicated in Article 9 alone.
B. National Legislation and the Principle of Unified Planning
Below the Constitution, several laws passed by the NPCSC direct
the administration and use of natural resources, 63 including the Mineral
Resources Law of the PRC (19 8 6 ).6 The Ministry of Geology and Mineral
Resources, a division now incorporated into the broader Ministry of Land
and Resources (MLR), drafted the Law.65 The Mineral Resources Law of
"[T]he theory of the Communists may be summed up in a single sentence: Abolition of
private property," Id. at 14, and, furthermore, states that in developed countries there will be "[a]bolition
of all right of inheritance." Id. at 20. The reader is likely aware that China has transitioned from a
revolutionary Communist state to a Socialist State, as stated in Article 1 of the 1982 Constitution:
"The People's Republic of China is a socialist state under the people's democratic
dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The socialist
system is the basic system of the People's Republic of China."
It must also be noted that China has been increasing its constitutional recognition of private
property rights for decades. Article 13 of the Constitution reads that:"The State protects the right of
citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses and other lawful property. The State protects
according to law the right of citizens to inherit private property."
In 2004, the 10th NPC expanded that provision to: "Citizens' lawful private property is
inviolable. The State, in accordance with law, protects the rights of citizens to private property and to its
inheritance. The State may, in the public interest and in accordance with law, expropriate or requisition
private property for its use and shall make compensation for the private property expropriated or
requisitioned."
62 GEOLOGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION 108 (Jiang Chengsong ed., 1998).
63 The other major laws are: Romanized Chinese law name (Chinese law name) [The
Forestry Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the 7th Session of the 6h Nat'l People's Cong., September
20, 1984, effective Jan. 1, 1985, available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/207457.htm;
Romanized Chinese law name (Chinese law name) [The Land Administration Law of the PRC]
(promulgated by the 4th Meeting of the Standing Comm. of the 9th Nat'1 People's Cong., Aug. 29, 1998,
effective Jan. 1, 1999), available at http://www.mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/200710/
t20071011_656321.htm; and Romanized Chinese law name (Chinese law name) [The Marine
Environmental Protection Law of the PRC] (promulgated by 13th Meeting of the Standing Comm. of
the 9th Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000) available at
http://www.mr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/200710/t 200 7 1Ol 2_656329.htm. The Forestry Law was drafted
by the State Forestry Administration, while the others were drafted by divisions now incorporated into a
broad Ministry of Land and Resources [hereinafter MLR].
' Romanized Chinese law name (Chinese law name) [The Mineral Resources Law]
(promulgated by 15th Meeting of the Standing Comm. of the 6th Nat'l People's Cong. Standing Comm.,
Mar. 19, 1986) available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/34342.htm [hereinafter
Mineral Resources Law].
65 According to the 1998 Structural Reform of the State Council, the Ministry of Land and
Resources was established by incorporating the Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources, the State
Land Administration, the State Ocean Administration and the State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping.
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the PRC (1986) has been amended and supplemented by volumes of
ancillary legislation.66 Chief among these is the Detailed Rules for the
61Implementation of the Mineral Resources Law, promulgated in 1994.
The MLR is a large department charged with responsibility for the
planning, administration, protection, and rational utilization of China's land,
marine and mineral resources.6 ' Although charged with responsibility for
planning, 69 the State Council retains ultimate control of all mineral
resources under a policy known as unified planning. 70 This concept
effectively allows the State Council to delegate its duty to oversee the
exploitation of mineral wealth to subordinate departments, and it is
imbedded in several provisions of the Mineral Resources Law. Article 3
lays a foundation for the concept by reiterating Chinese constitutional law
on mineral resources:
All mineral resources are owned by the State, and the State
Council shall exercise the State ownership over mineral
resources. The State ownership of surface and underground
See The Establishment of the Ministry of Land and Resources, MINISTRY OF LAND AND RESOURCES OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Mar. 08, 2005), available at
http://www.mir.gov.cn/mlrenglish/about/history/. For a more detailed evolution of the department, see
CHINA'S POLICY ON MINERAL RESOURCES, supra note 12.
66 First passed at the 15th session of the 6th NPCSC on 19 Mar. 1996, and amended at the
21st session of 8th NPCSC on 29 Aug. 1996. China has supplemented the Mineral Resources Law with
numerous rules and regulations including the "Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Mineral
Resources Law," "Regulations on the Exploitation of Offshore Oil Resources in Cooperation with
Foreign Enterprises," "Regulations on the Exploitation of Onshore Oil Resources by Foreign
Enterprises," "Measures Governing the Registration and Management of Areas for Surveying Mineral
Resources," "Measures Governing the Registration and Management of Mineral Resources
Exploitation," "Measures Governing Administration of the Transfer of Prospecting and Mining
Rights," "Provisions on the Administration of the Collection of Mineral Resources Compensation
Fees," "Interim Measures on the Supervision and Control of Mineral Resources," and "Regulations on
the Management of Geological Data."
67 Zhanghu6 rinmin g6nghigu6 kuangchan zlyu6n f6 shisht xiz6 ( AEfMf P
W fi-qil911]) [Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Mineral Resources Law] (promulgated by
State Council, Mar. 26, 1994, effective Mar. 26, 1994) Order No. 152, available at
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/zwgk/flfg/kczyflfg/200406/t2040625 293.htm (last visited 19 Dec. 2010).
61 Ministry of Land and Resources of the PRC, China's Management and Legal Systems for
Land Resources, MINISTRY OF LAND RESOURCES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Oct. 12, 2007),
available at http://www.mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/200710/t20071012 656323.htm. The State Council
delegates the task of administering mineral resources under Article 11 of the Mineral Resources Law to
the Ministry of Land and Resources: "The competent department of the State Council for geology and
mineral resources shall be in charge of the supervision and control of the prospecting and mining of
mineral resources in the whole country. Relevant competent departments of the State Council shall
assist it in carrying out such supervision and control."
69 Id.
'o Mineral Resources Law, at art. 3 ("Mineral resources shall be owned by the State. The
State's ownership of mineral resources shall be exercised by the State Council... .").
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mineral resources shall not be not changed by reason of
variance in the ownership or the right to the use of the land
to which they are attached.
Next, Article 7 establishes the theory of delegation, where the unified
planning concept is identified by name:
With regard to the exploration and development of mineral
resources, the State shall practise the policy of unified
planning, rational distribution, comprehensive exploration,
* * -72rational mining and comprehensive utilization.
Article 11 details the hierarchical structure through which provincial
authorities are responsible for implementing the unified plan:
The departments in charge of geology and mineral
resources under the people's governments of provinces,
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the
Central Government shall be in charge of supervision and
administration of the exploration and mining of the mineral
resources within their respective administrative areas.
Other relevant departments under the people's governments
of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities
directly under the Central Government shall assist the
departments in charge of geology and mineral resources at
the corresponding levels in supervising and administering
the exploration and mining of the mineral resources.
Finally, Article 28 of the LREA nominally provides the autonomous areas
with power to administer local natural and mineral resources. The Article
states:
In accordance with legal stipulations, autonomous organs
shall manage and protect the natural resources of these
areas; in accordance with legal stipulations and unified
state plans, autonomous organs may give priority to the
rational exploitation and utilization of the natural resources
that the local authorities are entitled to develop.7 4
7 Id. at art. 3.
72 Id. at art. 7.
73 Id. at art. 11.
74 See note 35.
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Nonetheless, in practice, this statement is but a truism. Local authorities,
even autonomous ones, are unable to convert resources addressed by the
unified plan. Thus, the State Council, on behalf of the State and the people,
delegates its duties to the MLR but retains ultimate authority over the
planning, administration, protection, and rational utilization of all mineral
resources in the PRC. Nonetheless, LREA Article 28 does serve as an
interesting supplement to Article 9 of the Constitution, introducing the
principle that ethnic authorities should have some authority over local
resources.
C. Mining Compensation Fees, Resource Taxes, and Special
Considerations for the Ethnic Minority Autonomous Regions
The State Council authorizes mining enterprises-most of them
State-owned 75 -to operate on its behalf while seeking gratuity through two
primary sources: mineral resource compensation fees and resource taxes.
The State shall adopt the system that exploration and
mining rights are to be obtained with compensation,
however, the State may also decide to reduce or grant
exemption to the compensation for acquiring exploration
and mining rights in consideration of specific situation.
Detailed measures and implementation procedures shall be
formulated by the State Council. Anyone who mines
mineral resources must pay resource tax and mineral
resource compensation of relevant provision of the State.76
1. Mineral Resource Compensation Fees
The Chinese government first began levying mineral resource
compensation fees in 1994,77 Stating:
7 Mineral Resources Law, at art. 4 ("The state-owned mining enterprises shall be the
principal force in mining mineral resources. The State shall guarantee the consolidation and
development of state-owned mineral economy.").
76 Mineral Resources Law, at art. 5; see also REPORT ON CHINA'S MINERAL RESOURCES 236
(Song Ruixiang ed., 1997) (emphasis added).
" CHINA'S POLICY ON MINERAL RESOURCES, supra note 11.
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The collection of the compensation fees for mineral
resources . . . embodies the rights and interests of the State
as the owner of the mineral resources, and is conducive to
establishing an economic incentive mechanism to promote
the protection and rational utilization of mineral
eSUCS78resources. 7
The matrix of compensation fees differs depending on whether the mining
is being conducted in a standard province or an autonomous area. Thus,
Article 10 of the MLR provides:
In mining mineral resources in nationalities' autonomous
areas, the State shall give due consideration to [t]he
interests of those areas and make arrangements favorable to
the areas' economic development and to the production and
livelihood of the local minority nationalities. The
autonomous government organization of the nationalities'
autonomous areas shall, in accordance with legal
provisions and the unified national plan, have priority to
develop and utilize those mineral resources that may be
developed by local entities.79
In 2005, the State Council issued a supplemental document entitled
"Several Provisions on the Implementation of the LREA," which further
provides:
The nation will set up resource exploitation and processing
projects in ethnic autonomous regions with priority to and
in accordance with the economic and social development
programs and Western Development strategies. Those who
exploit oil, natural gas or other resources in the
autonomous regions should help to support the local
service industries, employment and economic
development.
The nation should increase the inputs to the autonomous
regions during the allocation of mineral products
compensation fees, and make special priority to the areas
78 id.
79 Mineral Resources Law, at art. 10.
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of the autonomous regions where the mineral resources are
extracted.80
Article 5 of the "Provisions on the Administration of Collection of the
Mineral Resources Compensation" (Provisions) sets the formula for
calculating resource compensation fees, generally, as follows:
Amount of the mineral resources compensation fee to be collected
= axbxc,
Where:
a = sales income of mineral products,
b = compensation rate, and
c = the coefficient of mining recovery rate.s1
Article 10 of the Provisions also mandates the proportion of compensation
fee distribution between the central government and the non-autonomous
provinces is 5:5, while the proportion to be shared between the central
government and the EMAR is 4:6.82 Thus, the autonomous areas enjoy an
extra ten percent of compensation fees when compared with the non-
autonomous provinces.
Despite this special attention, the overall benefit to the EMARs is
insignificant. First, the current resources compensation fee ratio ranges
between only 0.5% and 4% of the total enterprise profit, depending on the
category of resources. 83 More importantly, the application of the
compensation fees is narrowly limited. The fees are included in the overall
State budget, 84 and the Provisions mandate that the fees be channeled
80 Zh6nghu6 Rinmin G6ngh6gu6 Gu6wiyuAn Ling (* A glI R i iliM )
[Several Provisions on the Implementation of the LREA] (promulgated at the 89 th Executive Meeting of
the State Council, May 11, 2005, effective May 31, 2005) art. 8:2, 8:3, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2005-05/27/content3091866.htm (last visited 13 Dec. 2010).
" See generally Decision of the State Council on Revising the Provisions on the
Administration of Collection of the Mineral Resources Compensation (promulgated by Decree No. 222
of the State Council, July 3, 1997, effective July 3, 1997) art. 5, (coefficient of mining recovery rate =
approved mining recovery rate / actual mining recovery rate) available at
http://www.chinamining.org/Policies/2006-08-04/1154678391d446.html.
8 Id. at art. 10.
See Guwity'uan guniv. xiagai kuangchan Zy U'j3M bchanlg fei zhengtshou guinl guidi
ng dc jued ag (F] O5-R I IT.T f< 7 WD r)E. t] ) [The Collection of
Compensation Fees for Mineral Resources: app. Table of Mineral Resources Compensation Rates]
(promulgated Bureau of Land and Resources, April 1, 1994, effective April 1, 1994), available at
http://www.yichun.gov.cn/Pub/xxgk/FaGui/2009-02/200902231739361135.html (last visited 13 Dec.
2010) [hereinafter Collection of Compensation Fees].
84 CHINA'S POLICY ON MINERAL RESOURCES, supra note 11.
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completely into further mineral drilling and exploration. 85 Thus, the
tangible benefit that the EMARs realize from the compensation fees is
minor, earmarked exclusively for further mineral extraction.
2. Resource Taxes
Taxes also provide a minimal benefit to the local authorities.
Historically, business income taxes often eluded collection. When China
still practiced centralized economic planning, its governmental patron
levied taxes on enterprises. The tax burden imposed on locally owned
enterprises belonged to local governments, while the tax revenue collected
from centrally owned enterprises belonged to the central authorities. This
was highly unjust in regions dominated by centrally owned enterprises. For
example, Xinjiang received little economic benefit for decades because
almost every notable mining enterprise operating in the EMAR was
centrally owned.
A major reform came when the State Council promulgated the
"Scheme on Income Taxes Revenue Sharing Reform" in 2001.88 With
exceptions for national industries such as the railroads, postal service, and
state-owned banking institutions, all business and individual income taxes
became sources of revenue shared between the central and local
governments.89 The exact ratio of that distribution is renegotiated annually.
For example, the ratio in 2002 between the central government and the
provincial governments was 5:5, increasing to 6:4 in 2003, with future
proportions "to be determined according to the specific circumstances"
thereafter. 90 Unfortunately, this also is not a primary source of finance for
local authorities. Resources taxes provide only 0.5% of China's total tax
revenue. 9' According to Xia Chunli, the total resources taxes (including
85 See Collection of Compensation Fees, supra note 83, at art. 11.
86 See David Bachman, Making Xinjiang Safe for the Han?, in GOVERNING CHINA'S
MULTIETHNIC FRONTIERS 155, 167-68 (Morris Rossabi ed., 2004).
87 Id.
8Gunyd yi n subdeshul shourfi fanxidng gaige f ng'6n de taingzM (Aff *V&
B AM) [Scheme on Income Tax Revenue Sharing Reform] (promulgated by the State
Council, Jan. 1, 2002, effective Jan.1, 2002) available at http://www.zttax.com/Basic/
s23/200608/2434.html.
9 Id. at §3:1.
9o Id. at §3:2; see also Xinhua News Agency, Income Tax Revenue Sharing Scheme Aims at
Common Prosperity, HIGHBEAM RES., http://www.highbeam.com/doc/IP2-13275098.html (last visited
Oct. 1, 2011).
91 Wang Ziwu, Resource Tax Reform Will Boost Local Government Revenue, CAIJING (June,
15 2010), http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-06-15/110184693.html ("Resources tax plays a tiny role in
China's overall taxation system ... Local governments currently receive revenue from resources taxes,
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taxes collected from offshore petroleum enterprises, which exclusively
benefit the central government) collected in 2002, 2003 and 2004 totaled
Y7.51, Y8.31 and Y9.91 billion respectively, accounting for only 0.44%,
0.41% and 0.39% of the overall taxes collected in those years.92
China's central authorities sought to remedy this inequity in 2010
when they announced a new reform of natural resources taxes focused on
Xinjiang. 93 According to An Tifu, an economist at Renmin University in
Beijing, proceeds from oil and gas extraction accounted for only 1.6% of
Xinjiang's 2007 tax revenue despite massive investment in new
cultivation. 94 The new ad-valorem tax levies a simple five percent surcharge
on crude oil and natural gas extraction.95 These are estimated to increase
Xinjiang's natural resource extraction revenue to five times their previous
level. 96 The measure was supposed to raise more than Y2 billion (USD
$293 million) for the EMAR in 2010.97 Han Wenke, director of China's
Energy Research Institute, confirmed the policy impetus for the reform is
the "development of the western region, allowing the funds received from
the west to stay in the west and support local development in Xinjiang."98
There is an expectation that after introducing the pilot program in Xinjiang,
this model of natural resources tax reform could be implemented
nationwide.99
except for those levied on offshore oil resources. According to the Ministry of Finance, annual revenue
collected from resources tax currently stands at 30 billion yuan, or just 0.5 percent of total tax revenue.").
92 Chunli, supra note 55, at 281.
9 Provisions for Xinjiang Oil and Natural Gas Tax Reform, XINHUA NET (June 2, 2010),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-06/02/c_12170647.htm; China Levies Resource Tax in
Xinjiang, CHINA DAILY (June 2, 2010,), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-
06/02/content 9923284.htm.
94 Shai Oster, China Launches Energy Tax in Xinjiang, WALL ST. J. ASIA (June 2, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748703561604575282181792884798.html
(last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
9 See Provisions for Xinjiang Oil and Natural Gas Tax Reform, supra note 93 (stating that
the equation is "Tax payable = Sales x tax rate," although there are exceptions to this rate for special
activities.); Resource Tax to be Levied in Xinjiang, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE (May 28, 2010),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/7004420.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
96 Oster, supra note 94.
' Resource Tax to be Levied in Xinjiang, supra note 96.
98 The Development and Reform Commission Said that Resource Tax Reform
Will Promote Development, XINJIANG Gov'T PORTAL, http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/10013/10036/10120/
10004/ 2010/66163.htm (last visited 19 Dec. 2010).
9 Oster, supra note 94; see also Lin Zhi, China Introduces Resource Tax in Xinjiang,




IV. THE IMPERATIVE FOR MORE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
Whereas Section III focused on the letter of the law managing
China's natural resource extraction from the EMARs, Section IV delves
deeper into the Constitution, national laws and political pronouncements to
extract competing and/or guiding principles that should be applied. Indeed,
the right to fair compensation for non-renewable resource extraction from
the EMARs is clear within the existing constructs of Chinese law, when the
imperatives of the Chinese Constitution (including the principle of
adherence to socialism), the LREA and major policy initiatives are
juxtaposed. This section makes the case that increased compensation is a
constitutional, legal, and moral imperative for China.
A. The Imperatives of the Chinese Constitution and the Principle of
Adherence to Socialism
As discussed in Section III, the Chinese government separates
ownership of the Earth's surface from sovereignty over its natural resources,
practices socialist public ownership of land, and ensures the rational use of
natural resources. 100 In short, Article 9 of the Constitution provides that
China's natural resources are the exclusive property of the central
authorities, under their guided administration. Although that provision
seems absolute, Section III outlined a more nuanced, pragmatic relationship
where the central authorities remand a very limited amount of resource
extraction proceeds back to the EMAR authorities, albeit for narrow
purposes.
However, Section II introduced the legal basis for the organization
of the autonomous system, codified in Articles 111-122.10' Restated, the
Constitution promises the EMAR leadership important fiscal rights
including the rights to administer regional finances in Article 117,102 and to
promote local economic development in Article 118. 103 Furthermore,
Article 122 mandates that the "State gives financial, material and technical
100 XIANFA [CONSTITUTION], art. 9, (1982) (China) available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
'01 Id. at art. 112-22, §6 (1982) (China).
1o2 Id. at art. 117 ("The organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas have the
power of autonomy in administering the finances of their areas. All revenues accruing to the national
autonomous areas under the financial system of the state shall be managed and used independently by
the organs of self- government of those areas.").
103 Id. at art. 118 ("The organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas
independently arrange for and administer local economic development under the guidance of state plans.
In developing natural resources and building enterprises in the national autonomous areas, the state shall
give due consideration to the interests of those areas.").
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assistance to the minority nationalities to accelerate their economic and
cultural development." 104 Thus, China's central authorities have a
constitutional duty to grant the EMAR a large degree of economic
autonomy and developmental aid. When the exclusive authority over
resources, the mandate to provide developmental aid to the EMAR, and the
fact that some resource extraction proceeds are remanded to local
authorities albeit for narrow purposes are juxtaposed against each other it
seems evident that a more direct, transparent, and equitable distribution of
proceeds would be constitutional.
Additionally, the Constitution contains a general principle of
adherence to socialism, which is highly relevant. Codified in Article 1,
Clause 2, it mandates that "the socialist system is the basic system of the
[PRC]." '0o This principle defines both the economic and social
superstructure that China shall have.106 In the early years of the CCP, this
meant State ownership of the means of production, 107 but the 1978
economic reforms brought many progressive changes, eventually granting
constitutional protection to the ownership of private property. 108 The
official mantra is that China still adheres to socialism, albeit "socialism
with Chinese characteristics."' 09 This means China shall continue to pursue
the establishment of a healthy, market-oriented economy while
incorporating social welfare components as conditions allow.1 0 Although
defining a common ideal of socialism is the subject of voluminous tomes, a
recent text simplified its essence as:
104 Id. at art. 122.
'os Id. at art. 1, cl. 2.
106 LIN FENG, CONSTITUIONAL LAW IN CHINA 33 (2000); see also XIANFA [CONSTITUTION]
art. 6-8, (1982) (China) available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html
(last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
'07 XU CHONGDE, CHINESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 120 (Zhongguo Xianfa), (People's Univ.
Press, 1996).
'os XIANFA [CONSTUTION], amend. IV § 6, (Dec, 4, 1982) (China) (expanding art. 13 to
"citizens' lawful private property is inviolable... .").
' Id at amend. II. ("China is at the primary stage of socialism. The basic task of the nation
is, according to the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, to concentrate its effort on
socialist modernization. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to
adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and follow the socialist road, persevere in reform and
opening to the outside, steadily improve socialist institutions, develop socialist democracy, improve the
socialist legal system and work hard and self-reliantly to modernize industry, agriculture, national
defense and science and technology step by step to turn China into a socialist country with prosperity
and power, democracy and culture.") (emphasis added).
110 See XIANFA [CONSTITUTION], art. 45 (1982) (China); LIN, supra note 106 at 33-34; Liu
Jianwu, What is Socialism with Chinese Characteristics?, available at actuelmarx.u-
parisl0.fr/cm5/com/MI 5 Contr liujianwu.rtf (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
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[T]he most fundamental characteristic of socialism is its
commitment to the creation of an egalitarian society.
Socialists may not have agreed about the extent to which
inequality can be eradicated or the means by which change
can be effected, but no socialist would defend the current
inequalities of wealth and power."
While even socialist egalitarian authors acknowledge the pragmatic
realities of uneven resource distribution,112 it can hardly be argued that
China's former policy of favoring the east at the expense of the west
honored this commitment. In China, where the adherence to socialism has
been incorporated into the Constitution, a moral duty to pursue balanced
socioeconomic development is an imperative. As this article suggests, one
way to promote socialist development would be to guarantee a more direct,
equitable distribution of the proceeds of non-renewable natural resource
extraction from the EMAR.
B. The Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy
The autonomous area system has been introduced herein.
Established in the Constitution, it is elaborated in much greater detail under
the LREA.113 The Preamble of the LREA restates the principle of ethnic
autonomy in broad terms:
Regional ethnic autonomy is the basic policy adopted by
the Communist Party of China for resolving the ethnic
issue in China through its application of Marxism-
Leninism. It . . . means that the ethnic minorities, under
unified state leadership, practice regional autonomy in
areas where they live in concentrated communities and set
up autonomous agencies for the exercise of the power of
autonomy. Regional ethnic autonomy reflects the State's
full respect for and guarantee of ethnic minorities' right to
111 MICHAEL NEWMAN, SOCIALISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 1-3 (2005) ("Socialists
may not have agreed about the extent to which inequality can be eradicated or the means by which
change can be effected, but no socialist would defend the current inequalities of wealth and power.").
112 Kai Nielson, Liberal and Socialist Egalitarianism, ERUDIT.ORG
http://www.erudit.org/revue/LTP/1990/v46/nl/400511ar.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). ("Resources
should not be exactly equal because people's needs (to understate it) are not exactly the same. The thing
to aim at is an equal satisfaction of needs or, more accurately, providing social conditions which make
the equal satisfaction of needs possible as far as human nature allows for it.").
113 Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy.
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administer their internal affairs and its adherence to the
principle of equality, unity and common prosperity for all
nationalities.l 14
In pursuit of this aim, the LREA includes several provisions for
redistributive economic assistance to the EMARs. Article 59 mandates the
State to set aside special funds to help ethnic autonomous areas develop
their economies and cultures.11 Article 60 requires higher-level state organs
to give financial and tax support to develop commerce in the ethnic
autonomous areas.1 6 Article 62 states that as national revenues increase, the
higher-level financial organs shall gradually increase financial transfer
payments to the autonomous areas to gradually decrease disparities
"between the minority areas and more developed regions." 17 Finally,
Article 65 of the LREA specifically promises:
While exploiting resources and undertaking construction in
ethnic autonomous areas, the State shall give consideration
to the interests of these areas, make arrangements favorable
to economic construction there and pay proper attention to
the productive pursuits and the life of the minority
nationalities there. When exporting natural resources out of
the autonomous areas, the state should give them a certain
amount of compensation."8
This final statement creates a solid legal basis upon which to reform the
current regime and more equitably distribute the revenue from non-
renewable natural resources extraction from the EMARs.
C. The Western Development Strategy
A major 1999 policy initiative is in harmony with these laws and
provisions. Given that all five EMARs and most other autonomous
subdivisions are located in China's west, developing the west amounts to
developing the lives of minorities. The region received renewed attention in
1999 when President Jiang Zemin and the CCP announced a policy
114 Id. at Preamble.
"' Id. at art. 59.
"6 Id. at art. 60.
" Id. at art. 62.
"S Id. at art. 65, (emphasis added).
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campaign to "Open Up the West" (xibu da kaifa),1l9 which shifted the focus
of national development to the western region from the eastern and
southern regions for the first time since 1978.120 According to a 2000 policy
paper published by the State Council,121 many preferential policies would
be offered to the western regions to facilitate the rapid development of a
prosperous economy, increase living standards, modernize infrastructure,
improve the environment, enhance border security, and develop a more
civil society featuring harmonious relations between ethnic nationalities.122
Priority would be given to new fiscal transfers, tax reforms, foreign
investment and trade initiatives, resource exploitation and conservation
programs, and special consideration for several specific developmental
projects and zones, including the EMARs.123
According to official statistics provided by the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the central government
poured over Y 3.5 trillion (USD $512.4 billion) into the WDS work
projects in the first decade (through 2009). The NDRC further claims that
the GDP of the western region jumped from Y 1.66 trillion to Y 5.82
trillion at an annual average growth rate of 11.7% during that time,
allowing more than 9.54 million residents to escape poverty.124 Although it
is difficult to locate precise statistics on oil and mineral mining operations
"9 Heike Holbig, The Emergence of the Campaign to Open Up the West: Ideological
Formation, Central-Decision Making and the Role of the Provinces 21, in CHINA'S CAMPAIGN TO
"OPEN UP THE WEST": NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES, (David S.G. Goodman ed.,
2004).
120 Id. (explaining that previously, Mao had focused on western development through the
Third Front strategy to industrialize inland China for protection if a foreign invasion would come, but
Deng Xiaoping's reforms shifted developmental priority to China's east and south "largely building on
its perceived comparative advantage of proximity to the wider East Asian economies and the outside
world."); see also Fan Jie, Western Development Policy: Changes, Effects and Evaluation, in
DEVELOPING CHINA'S WEST, supra note 1, at 85-88.
121 Guowuyuan guanyu shishi xibu dakaifa ruogan zhengce cuoshi de tongzhi (1514-RA-
AMRE l f LJ) [Circular of the State Council Concerning Several Policies on
Carrying out the Development of China's Vast Western Regions] (promulgated by the State Council,
Oct. 26, 2000, effective January 1, 2001), No. 2000-33, available at
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/cotsccspocotdocvwrl 122/
122 Id.; see also Li Xiaojian et al., Historical Legacy and Future Challenges, in DEVELOPING
CHINA'S WEST, supra note 1, at 38; see also Guo RONGXING, HOW THE CHINESE ECONOMY WORKS,
203, (Ch. 8: Spatial Economics and Development Strategy)(Palgrave Macmillian, 3d ed., 2009).
123 Id.; see also Shiwu xibu kaifa zongti guihua (+ H#EH f3RdMJ) [The Tenth
Comprehensive Five-Year Plan for Development of the West] (promulgated July 10, 2002, effective
July 10, 2002), available at http://www.moc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/jiaotongguihua/guojiaguihual
guojiaxiangguanZHGH/200709/t20070927_420871.html.
124 Western Development Strategy, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 22, 2009),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/westdevelopment/2009-12/22/content_9215054.htm.
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opened in the EMARs since WDS implementation,12 5 there is every reason
to believe that such expansion is taking place. Not only has the
development of the west's mineral resources been tied to the WDS, 126 but
also national investment in these resources grew at an exponential rate even
in the pre-WDS period. The PRC had "just over 300 properly developed
mines" in 1949, increasing to 489 "large mines," 1,025 "medium-sized"
mines, and "well over 140,000 small ones" in 2002 for a combined
industrial output sum of Y 454.2 billion. 127 Furthermore, China's top
energy companies, China National Petroleum Corporation and Sinopec,
recently invested Y 14.6 billion to double the oil output from Xinjiang.128
Given the overlap of natural resources and minority ethnic nationality
population concentrations, there is little doubt that the expansion of mining
since 1999 has and will continue to be a comparative advantage for the
region. In concert with the government's policies to develop the west
generally and EMARs specifically, a key component of regional ethnic
autonomy should be the ability of the indigenous ethnic minorities to
directly benefit from the non-renewable resources extracted from the region.
D. Current Shortcomings and Suggestions for Reform
It is vital to note again that the central authorities allocate trillions
of yuan ( Y) into the development of the western region through an
advanced transfer payment system and other grants-all investments that
deserve great praise. However, the linkage between non-renewable resource
extraction and regional development is indirect, and therefore, often
appears attenuated under the current redistribution policies. That is causing
a distortion of perception. As outlined above, the tax proceeds directly
benefiting the EMAR authorities-be it through business income or
resources taxes-are quite low. Furthermore, the current mineral
compensation fee regime invites criticism, as it is apparent that the current
ratio-only 60% of between 0.5% to 4% of the mine's total profits, all of
which must be reinvested in further mining operations-is inadequate.
125 Bus. GUIDE at 19, ("China is developing fast and this information can sometimes be
unreliable or difficult to obtain.").
126 CHINA'S POLICY ON MINERAL RESOURCES (2003), supra note 11 ("With the
implementation of the western development strategy, the accelerated construction of infrastructure
facilities and ecological protection will help to connect quickly the resources and the resource-related
products of the western regions with the domestic and international markets, thereby greatly improving
the conditions for the exploitation of mineral resources and the entry of mineral commodities into the
market.").
127 id.
128 Bus. GUIDE, supra note 19, at 131.
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Multiple outlets record and amplify the local belief that regional resources
are being exploited for the benefit of distant Han majorities. 129 Foreign
activists decry the famous Qinghai-Tibet Railway project as a front for ever
more insatiable extraction,o30 while resource investors chomp at the bit to
advertise new business opportunities.' 3 1 Fear of sabotage partially underlies
the necessity for Beijing to adopt and invest in a new Oil Pipeline
Protection Law as massive new pipelines from Xinjiang come online.13 2
That perception can be changed, and more harmonious relations may
indeed develop, if the local ethnic minority authorities are allowed to
directly channel a fair portion of the extraction profits into tangible and
beneficial local investments, such as schools, hospitals, and roads.
Beijing should implement its new Xinjiang resource tax policy
nationwide and amend its mineral resources compensation fee distribution
scheme in order to demonstrate a direct linkage between mineral extraction
and economic benefits to the EMARs. The authors of this article are not
expert enough to suggest what that exact ratio should be under ever-
changing national circumstances, but the current ratio (when considered
alone) distorts Beijing's commitment to invest in the western region.
Furthermore, due to the special consideration provisions established under
Article 122 of the Constitution 33 and developed under Articles 59, 60, 61,
and 62 of the LREA,134 preferential rates for the EMARs are a legal
imperative.
129 China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tensions, supra note 42, at 23-
25.
"30 See Tracking the Steel Dragon: How China's Economic Policies and the Railroad are
Transforming Tibet, INT'L CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET, (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.savetibet.org/media-
center/ict-press-releases/tracking-steel-dragon-how-chinas-economic-policies-and-railroad-are-
transforming-tibet ; see also Railroad to Ruin, U.S.-TBET COMMITTEE,
http://www.ustibetcommittee.org/campaigns/railroad.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
' ' Resource Investor, Tibet Railway Opens the Gates for Mining, Interfax-China, Jul. 28,
2006, available at http://www.resourceinvestor.com/News/2006/7/Pages/Tibet-Railway-Opens-the-
Gates-for-Mining.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2011) ("With the opening of the new Qinghai-Tibet
railway earlier this summer, could come a rampage of exploitation by many mining companies chasing
the expansive mineral resources hidden in the mountain province.").
132 Romanized Chinese name (Chinese law name) [Law of the People's Republic of China on
the Protection of Petroleum and Natural Gas Pipelines] (promulgated by Order of the President of the
People's Republic of China, Jun. 25, 2010, effective Oct. 1, 2010) No. 30, available at
http://www.lexiscn.com/law/content.php?provider id=l&originid=l322077&isEnglish=Y&fromMail
-true (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
133 XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art.122, (1982) (China) available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) ("The State
gives financial, material and technical assistance to the minority nationalities to accelerate their
economic and cultural development.").
134 Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy, at art. 59-62,
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The Chinese authorities have detailed an expansive, yet
overlapping and complimentary set of commitments in their Constitution,
highest national laws, and major policy initiatives. They want to increase
the standard of living for all Chinese citizens by improving national
economic performance. They seek to address growing regional disparity by
shifting macroeconomic priority from the southeastern seaboard to the
neglected western regions where inequity is outstanding, but natural
resources are a great comparative advantage. They aspire to a more
harmonious relationship between the Han majority and its minority
denizens who largely inhabit that western region. Honoring these mutually
reinforcing commitments by drawing a more direct and transparent link
between resource extraction and developmental aid would be both logical
and beneficial to all. 3 5
Luckily, this swirling kaleidoscope of ethnic and fiscal policy
considerations can focus on a clear picture if Beijing takes the time to
coordinate its initiatives into one clear, coherent policy. The WDS provides
that umbrella, and the fiscal reform of natural resources mining proceeds to
("Article 59: The state sets aside special funds to help ethnic autonomous areas
develop their economy and culture ...
Article 60: In accordance with the state's trade policy for minority nationalities
and the needs of the regional autonomous area, state organs at higher levels give investment, financial,
and tax support to help commercial, supply and marketing, and medical and pharmaceutical enterprises
in ethnic autonomous areas.
Article 61: The state shall develop preferential policies to increase border trade,
develop regional autonomous areas' international trade, encourage the development of locally superior
products and exports, and increase the autonomous areas' independent management of international
dealings in the manufacturing sector.
Article 62: As the national economy develops and national revenues increase, the
higher level financial organs shall gradually increase financial transfer payments to autonomous areas.
State organs at higher levels use regular transfer payments, earmarked funds, preferential transfer
payment policies for minorities, or other methods determined by the state to increase investment funds
to autonomous areas. In this way, the state will speed up economic development and social progress,
gradually decreasing disparities between minority areas and more developed regions.").
3s These policy considerations are linked together in CHINA'S POLICY ON MINERAL
RESOURCES (2003), supra note 11, ("[We shall persist] in balanced development between regional
mineral resources prospecting and exploitation and environmental protection. We shall work out unified
plans and correctly handle the relations between eastern and western regions, between well-developed
and less-developed regions, between prospecting and exploitation, between state-owned mining
enterprises and non-state-owned mining enterprises, and between scale exploitation and excavation by
small mines. We shall further implement the strategy of large-scale development of the western regions,
accelerate exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in the western regions, especially the
dominant minerals and minerals in short supply at home, support mining towns and old mines in their
search for substitute resources, and promote the balanced development of regional economies and the
healthy development of mineral resources prospecting and exploitation. We shall persist in combinin2
mineral resources exploitation with attention to the interests of the regions inhabited by ethnic
minorities, and strengthen the protection, restoration and control of the mining environment on the
principle of putting prevention first and combining prevention with control.") (emphasis added).
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ethnic minority areas should be a paramount priority under it. As the
Chinese say, in an uncannily similar expression as their English-speaking
counterparts, "-, -A" or "- IAN," it is possible to "kill two birds
with one stone."
V. CONCLUSION
Although many Chinese ethnic minorities have indirectly benefited
from China's macroeconomic policies, their greater socioeconomic
development was neglected until the CCP announced the WDS in 1999.
The majority of China's ethnic minorities inhabit the vast western region,
where most of China's natural resource wealth remains. Therefore, non-
renewable resource exploitation must be conducted with compassion for
local interests, which in the past has not been done. Extraction must be
directly tied to tangible local benefits such as industrial development, the
construction of new infrastructure, and observable increases in local quality
of life. At present, local resources continue to flow out of the western
region and into the east with an inadequate link between that extraction and
Beijing's reinvestment, although the 2010 Xinjiang Resource Tax Reform
is a promising development. Beijing should implement its new Xinjiang
resource tax policy nationwide and amend its mineral resources
compensation fee distribution scheme in order to demonstrate a direct
linkage between mineral extraction and economic benefits to the EMARs.
Doing so is imperative under the Chinese Constitution and meaningful
national legislation, and will help China continue to build its economic
prosperity and social unity. The father of modern China, former Chairman
Mao Zedong, once spoke words linking the ethnic minorities and their
mineral wealth that remain as true today as they were when he pronounced
them fifty-five years ago:
We must sincerely and actively help the ethnic minorities
to develop their economy and culture . . . The air in the
atmosphere, the forests on the earth and the riches under
the soil are all important factors needed for the building of
socialism, but no material factor can be exploited and
utilized without the human factor. We must foster good
relations between the Han nationality and the minority
nationalities and strengthen the unity of all the nationalities
in the common endeavour to build our great socialist
motherland. 136
136 Zedong, supra note 24.
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